



LIABILITY OF RAILROAD COMPANIES FOR NEGLIGENCE.
Txm adjudicated cases in the United States, upon the liability
of railroad. companies for negligence are far to.o'numerous to be
examined in detail within the limits of an essay. But the gene-
ral principles applied by the courts aie essentially the same in all
the states, and it has 'been thought by the writer of the present
article tlat a discussion of the most important -rules which.may
be considered as esiablished, aIthoug h illustrated chiefly 'by
reference to the decisions of a single state, will ilot be without
interest and value to the profession. generally. "
A railroad corporation has relations to its employees, to its
passengers, to the-public generally, and to property. Its duties
to the public may be considered, with reference* to adults :and
infants, and to them when at the 'crossings, and on the compan's
roadway. Its duties to property may be discussed in respect to
the domestic animals, at crossings and on the company's roadway,
and also in respect to' real and other perishable property along its
route.
The iights and duties of such a corporation as to its employees
are determined by the law of master and servant. The company
is bound to hire men who are fit for their -business, and who are"
sober and tried.* It is the right of each-servant, that his fellow-
servants should be able to discharge their duties, so that while he
'OL. XVI.-29 (449) .-
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is fulfilling his, he may not be imperilled by their incompetency.
Passengers and the public have the same right. Hence it is that
the company must answer for consequences resulting from thr
inefficient performance of the business of their employees.
The company engage, in law, to carry each passenger safet
from his point of entrance to his point of exi.t. They must pro
vide staunch and roadworthy carriages. They must have theii
track in good order hnd free from obstruction. "They must pro
vide convenient and easy means of access to and departure from
their cars. The passenger, in turn) must comply with all reason-
able regulations concerning his entrance into, his stay in, and his
delarture from thb cars. Safe carriage is the paramount duty
of the company. Hence they have a right to a free track as
against all trespassers, and must keep a clear track for their pas-
sengers by the exercise of their utmost diligence.
The public are not entitled to occupy the roadway of the com-
pany except at the crossings, and then they must use reasonable
despatch in crssing." The duty of care upon the company's ser-
vants and upon the public at intersections is mutual. Each has a
right to expect this from the other. Therefore, in a city the com-
pany is bound to use all known and reasonable precautions te
insure the safety of the public, such as the, use of bells, steam.
whistles, flaigmen, gates, lights by night. The employment- of any
or all these miist depend on the degree of public use of the high
way. The public are .bound to a diligence proportioned t6 the
possible danger, and on warning giveni to. stop. At all other
places than crossings, the company is entitl7d to exclusive posses
sion of their roadway, and any person on it without authority -f
law is a trespasser.
Off the crossings the company's servants have a right to pre-
sume that there are no trespassers on the roadway. They are
not bound to look out for trespassers, except for the safety of
passengers. If a trespasser is seen, the company's servants will
not render the corporation liable except f6r wanton negligence.
The obligations of care and diligence rest on the trespasser.
But in the ease of a child of tender years the rule is different.
Such a child lacks the capacity of exercising care. If left to ge
unattended, this is negligence in the parent and debars him from
recovery. But the child is not barred. The company must exer-
cise at crossings a diligence increased by the child's vant of
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capacity, and if, on the roadway, the child, though a trespasser,
is seen, the engineer must use every practicable effort to stop.
Animals let loose and unattended are trespassers on the public
road. Hence if injured at a crossing the company are not liable
for anything but wanton negligence. But if attended, and travel.
ling, and the attendant is not negligent, the company are liable
for injuries done to them, if the result of want of care. What
has been said of the duty of the company to the public at cross-
ings, is predicable of its duty to animals also.
The company, as against the owners of animals, are not bound
to fence. Hence cattle on the roadway of the company trespass,
and the owner can recover only for wanton negligence. If injury
accrues to tha company, the owner is liable to it. A duty to
fence or to take any other precaution, arises solely from the obli-
gation to transport safely.
With respect to perishable property along the line of the
route, such as woods, hay, lumber, buildings, the company are
bound to use ordinary care. But care varies with circumstances.
In dry weather ordinary care is a watchfulness much greater than
in wet. The company'are bound to use the best spark arresters
as to have competent men to manage the fires of their engines.
Negligence is not doing what should have been done, or doing
what should not have been done, in either case occasioning injury
to another unintentionally. Where the measure or standard of
duty is fixed, negligence is a question of law. Where the rule is
a shifting one, the question is one of fact. " Hence it is sometimes
the province of the court to lay down what negligence.is, at other'
times the jury alone must determine "what the standard is, as
well as find whether it -has been complied with."
It is law that a plaintiff whose negligence has assisted at all in
causing the alleged injury cannot recover. Where the rule of
duty is fixed and definite, it is'usually the plaintiff's duty to show
that he complied with it; and in such cases the burden of proving
that he was not negligent falls on him. But' where the standard
shifts with the facts -of each case, negligence must be proved by
the party averring it. -The plaintiff must always establish- the
alleged negligence of the defendant. The law will not presume
it for him.
Where a rule of duty is fixed and clear, proof of what' the
plaintiff's conduct was will show at once whether he has or ha3
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not complied with the rule, or, it will enable the court to ascerfain
and pronounce whether the plaintiff has or has not committed con-
tributory negligence. But where the rule is not a fixed one, but
the question is whether either party did as they should not have
done, or did not do as they should have done, the proof of the con-
duct of the parties is at most evidence of negligence for the jury.
In RByan v. Cumberland Valley Railroad, 11 Harris 884, it
was ruled that where several persons are employed in the same
general service, and one is injured from the carelessness of an-
other, the employer is not responsible. . This rule was affirmed in
Frazier v. The Penna. -Railroad, 2 Wright 104; but the follow-
ing exception was -announced: that the company is responsible to
an employee for the carelessness of another knqwn by it to be
unfit for his business.
The same principle is announced in Caldwell v. Brown, 8 P. F.
Smith 458, 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 752, which, however, is not a
railroad case, in these words: "An employer is not bound to
indemnify an employee for losses in consequence of the ordinary
risks of the business, nor of the negligence of another person
employed by the same employer in the same general business,
unless he has neglected to use ordinary care in the selection
of the culpable employee."
The rule, as stated, was adhered to in Arm*s rong v. Catawissa
Railroad, 13-Wright 186, but not extended; ;b being held that
where two companies used a road in common, a servant of the onf
was not a fellow-servant of the servants of the other I and tht.
employers of the latter were responsible to the former for their.
carelessness. In Frazier's Case it was ruled that the exception
was nullified, if the servant injured was 3xvare of .his fellow-set
vant's incompetency and made no complaint, and continued to servw
with him. In Loclkhart v. Lichtenzthaler, 10 Wright 151, 4 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 15, it was held, that a brakesman in the employ-
ment of the owner of a private line of cars was not a servant of, but
a passenger on the road furnishing the motive power.' Penna.
I Judge REDPIELD, commenting on Railroad Co. v. Collins, 5 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 274, claims that the master is responsible for any want of skill or care
in respect of employing competent an trustworthy servants and in sufficient num.
bers ; and also in respect of furnishing safe and suitable machinery for the work
in hand, unless the servants knowing, or having the means of knowing of the
deficiency in furnishing proper help or machinery, consent to continue in the em-
ployment. And the neglect or want of skill of the master's general agent em.
ployed in procuring help and machinery is the act of the master.
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Railroad v. Zebe, 1 Wright 423, holds that a company is bound
to have safe and convenient means of egress and regress to and
from the line of the road. Penna. Railroad v. Kilgore, 8 Casey
292, and Passenger Railway v. Stutler, 4 P. F. Smith 375, hold
that a company is bound to stop a sufficient length of time to allow
all passengers whose destination is a given point to alight there.
Penna. Railroad v. Zebe, 9 Casey 318, holds that the passenger
must alight at the point and on the side provided by the company.
These principles are illustrated by the opinion of WOODWARD, late
C. J., in Sullivan v. Phila. and Reading Railroad, 6 Casey 238,
who announces that, on the part of the passenger, his consent is
implied to all the company's reasonable rules and regulations for
entering, occupying, and leaving their cars, and if injury befall
him by reason of his disregard of them, this is his own negligence
concurring in causing the mischief. On the part of the compaily,
the contract implies that they are provided with a safe atd suffi-
cient railroad to the point indicated; that their cars are staunch
and roadworthy ; that means have been taken beforehand to guard
against every apparent danger that may beset the passenger, and
that the servants in charge are tried, sober, and competent men.
If in performing this contract a passenger not at fault. is hurt, the
law presumes negligence and throws bn the company the onus of
showing it did not exist. Their paramount duty is the passen-"
ger's-safeby.
But the company is not bound to place guards on the car
windows; and if the facts are undisputed that a passenger was.
injured from putting his arm out of a car windowi the court
should pronounce him negligent as matter of law: Pitisburgh
and Conr. Railroad v; McClurg, 7 Am. Law Reg. 277.
To this may be subjoined, by way of in pari-materia, observa-
tions of Judge GIBSON in Tenery v. Pippingr, 1 Phila. Rep.
543, that "a carrier of passengers i~s bound to exercise the ut-
most care'and discretion. He is answerable for the least possible
degree of negligence or carelessness. The.happening of an injury
raises a presumption of want of care, and throws on the carrier
the burden of disproving it." .
But, as ruled in Goldey v. Penna. Railroad, 6 Casey 242, a
contract, limiting the liability of. a railroad as carriers, may
relieve them from those conclusive presumptions of law which
arise when.the accident is not inevitable, and require that negli-
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gence be proved against them. This ruling is maintained in
Powell v. The Railroad, 8 Casey 414, and in Henderson v. The
Railroad, 1 P. F. Smith 315.
At this point may be noticed a proposition of Judge GIBSON ir.
Tenery v. Pippinger, supra. This case related to the rights and
duties of passengers on a public stage, but, it is submitted, is
applicable to railrQads. "Passengers engage their passage on
the basis of the customs of the country. These are incorporated
with, and become a part of, the contract. It is matter of experi-
-ence, I might almost say of general history, that our public
stages have been crowded with as many passengers as they could
carry. A railway company differs from a stage company, in its
possession of an almost limitless motive power, and in its ability
to attach to an engine a great number of carriages. There is,
therefore, ordinarily-no necessity for overcrowded cars, and the
company would seem bound to take notice of the habits of the
travelling public, and. to provide cofresponding accommodations.'
In The Railroad v. Hind, 3 P. F. Smith 517, WOOD WARD, C. J.,
says, ' To allow undue numbers to enter a car is a great wrong,
and in a suitable case we would not hesitate to chastise the prac-
tice severely." Of course it is only possible to allude to first
principles in this connection. In all cases arising under them,
the rule of duty would vary with their special circumstances, and
negligence would be for the jury pre-eminently. But it may be
noticed that it was recently held in one of the New York courts,
that, though the company had a rule forbidding its passengers to
stand oix the car platform, yet a passenger -obliged to stand there
from overcrowding the car and injured, could maintain his action
equally with one seated within.
In The Railroad v. Robinson, 8 Wright' 175, which was a suit*
brought by children for the death of their' father, a pedestrian,
alleged to have been occasioned by negligence of the company's
servants in roping a coal-car into a private yard, the court ap-
proved the charge of HARE, J., in the court below," that if a
warning was given to the deceased, and was such as to convey
knowledge of the state of the case and the danger to be incurred,
and he went on with knowledge of his situation so derived, or
derived from any other source, it was a bar to the action."
The Railroad v. Heileman, 13 Wright 60, was the case of one
travelling in his wagon on the public road and injured by col-
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i ion at a crossing. The court say that at such an intersection
nither the company nor the public have exclusive rights of pas-
sage. Their rights are concurrent. When the traveller approaches
it, it is his duty to look out for approaching trains and engines.
This is a fixed rule of duty. If he fails to take the precaution,
his omission to perform his duty is negligence, and he cannot
recover.
The obligations of the company are enforced in Reeves v. The
Railroad, 6 Casey 461, where it is said that a person lawfully
using a public road, which crosses a railroad, at grade, has a
right to presume that the servants of the company will take all
reasonable and proper precautions to avoid injury to a person
lawftilly on the road. He is not bound to give a signil to an
approaching train.
These principles were expanded in The Railroad v. Evans, 3
P. F. Smith 255. The plaintiff, who was entering Pittsburgh with
his team when 'injured, "had a right to pass along the street
across the railroad in pursuit of his usual avocations. On
approaching the road it was his duty to look and listen for an
approaching locomotive, and if he saw or heard one coming to
get himself'out of the reach of it: He had no right to stop on
the railroad, nor so near it as to be struck by the engine or the
train. If he might have heard or seen the train approaching, or
if he saw it, and mistook the track it was on, it was negligence
in him not to exercise his senses correctly and llace himself jout
of danger. It was the right of the defendants to run locomotives
on their road at the speed usual in cities and towns. In approach-
ing grade-crossings, they are bound to give signals by a bell, a
whistle, or head-light, or a flagman, or such other device as would
be sufficient to giire people of ordinary prudence notice of their
approach. Any neglect of either of these duties would be cul-
pable negligence, and if the accident resulted from such negli-
gence on. the part of both parties, neither could recover against
the -ther."
It is said in Railroad v. Norton, 12 Harris A65, that because
a company undertak6 to carry its passengers safely it must haye
a clear track. If therefore a man places himself on th track,
le must not expect the law to do more for him than to punish
wanton injury.. If he be injured from the ordinary pursuit of the
company's legalized business, let him blame his owfi rashness and
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folly. And in The Railroad v. Spearer, 11 Wright 300, it" is
said that if the engineer sees an adult on the roadway, where he
has no legal right to be, and the train is in full view, and nothing
to indicate a want of consciousness by the adult of the approach
of the train, the engineer, having a right to a clear track, would
be entitled to presume that the trespasser vould remove in time
to avoid danger, or if he thought the adult 'did not notice the
train, it would be sufficient to whistle to attract his notice, with-
.out stopping the train.
The Railroad v. Spearer, 11 Wrigh. 800, was the case of a
child five years old suing-by her next friend. In place of cross-
ing. at the intersection of the street, she went down about thirty
yards upon the company's roadway. As she 'stood there a train
passed her. An engine was following in close proximity. When
the train got by, the. child tried, to cross the track before the
engine could get to her, and was thrown down by it and mutilated.
The court ruled in substance as follows: The.child had no right to
be on the roadway of-the company. After the engine had got by
the crossing, th engineer had a right, as against thoie not law-
fully on the roadway, to expect it to be clear, and was therefore
required touse only the ordinary care appropriate to his duties
in that locality. But a child of five is not subject to the rule of
contributing negligence like an adult. Upon seeing it, it would
be -the duty of. the engineer to stop his train. The change- of
circumstances from the possession of a capacity in an adult tres-
passer to avoid the danger, to a want of it, would create -a corres-
ponding duty in the engineer. In the latter case, the child not
concurring, for want of capacity, in the negligence causing the
disaster, the want of ordinary care in the engineer would create
liability. But if the train came unexpectedly on the child, or if
it threw itielf in the way of the train suddenly, the engineer being
then incapable of exercising the measure of ordinary care to save
it. the child would be without remedy, for the company's use of.
its track was lawful. and the child's presence there was unlawful'
I Smith v. O'Connor, 12 Wright 218, was the case of a child suing a
wagoner for running over and injuring her in the public street. The court there
ruled, that a child of tender years is held only to the exercise of- that degree of
care and discretion ordinarily to be expected from children of that age, and is not
culpable for failing to exercise a prudence and care which belongs only to persons
of riper years. But, intimated the court, the foregoing rule is applicable On1l
where the child sues. If a parent sue for an injury by which the services of h.s
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The principle was roted in alassey v. The iestonville o'nd
Fairmount Passenger Railway. In this case, recently decided
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, but not yet reported, it
was held that it was cntributing negligence in a. parent knowingly
to allow a child of fur years of age to go about unattended in a
public street of Philadelphia, and that he could not recover for
the injury occasioned by the negligence of the Passenger Rail-
way Company to his child.
In The Passcnger Railway v. Stutler, 4 P. F. Smith 845, a
strong distinction is taken between pure wrongs, such as seduc-
lion, or battery, %rid torts springing from a breach of contract; and
,t was held thp-t in torts which consist in a mere omission of a
contract duty, no legal remedy exists except an action on the case,
which musk be brought by the party injured, and cannot be by
%he master
The -su t was by a mother for injury done to her minor son, a
passenqe , by the negligence of a carrier.
Thesp. principles were inculcated in The Railroad v. -Skinner, 7
farris 998. A railway company is in exclusive possession of
,round paid for as an incorporeal hereditament, and owns a license
to use the greatest attainable rat6, of speed, with- which neither
)he person nor the property of another may interfere. An Ameri-
van company is not bound to fence it railway. It ia within the
English rule, that the entry of another's cattle upon its possession
)s a trespass. The common law of Pennsylvahia excepts from
ihis .rule only woodland and waste field.. Hence, as regards any
one except the owner of a forest or a waste field, the owner com.
mits negligence in the very act of turning his cattle'loose .. If
they are killed or injured on a railway, the owner has no recourse,
but is himself liable for damage done by them to the company or
'ts passengers.
The above rulings were amplified in The Railroad v. Rehman.
L3 Wright 101, 5 Am. Law Reg. 49. Rehman's mules had es-
taped from a pasture adjoining the railroad, the fences of which
were proved to be in good order. The court observes, " Whether,
therefore, the plaintiff's mules escaped from an enclosed field or
not, in view of the trespas on the defendants' road, I do not tfink
makes any difference in this case. It was undisputed that they
infant son are lost, there would enter into the case, his duty to shield his child from
danger, which is the greater the more helpless he is.
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were on defendants' road without license. If so, they were there
wrongfully-they were trespassers. How can the owner separate
his case from the wrong done by his cattle ? Intention, nay,
effort to prevent, will not make their occupancy of the track law.
ful. He was bound to restrain them at his peril. He did not
restrain them so as to prevent their being in the way of the de-
fendants, and I see -not how he can lawfully demand compensation
in such an aspect of the case."
The company's obligation as carriers are enforced in Sullivan
v. The Railroad, 6 Casey 236. As between the company and
the passenger, the company are bound to see that the cattle are
fenced out. If cattle are accustomed to wander on unenclose d
grounds through which the road runs, the company are bound to
take notice of this fact, and either by fencing in their track, or by
enforcing the owner's obligation to keep his cattle at home, or by
moderating the speed of the train, or in some other manner, to
secure the safety of the passenger. If they tolerate obstructions,
they must avoid the danger by reduced speed and increased vigi-
lance, or answer for the consequences.
In Rehman's case, supra, his loose mules were killed at a cross-
ing. Reeves v. The Railroad, 6 Casey 454, was a suit brought
for cattle killed at a crossing, which were attended. The drove
numbered, above three hundred. The drover when about thirty
rods from the crossing was answered by an employee of the com-
pany. that the train would be along in five minutes or so. He
divided his cattle into sections, moved one across the track, and
was moving a second when the train dashed into it at the rate of
twenty-five or thirty miles an hour and killed Several. The cross-
ing was approached by the train through a -ut and curve. For
some half mile before coming to the cut, th6 turnpike was in full
view of the engine, and the cattle stretched for that distance
along the pike. The court say, "Duties grow out of circum-
stances. And in view of these circumstances, we have no hesitation
in saying that it was the duty of the engineer to observe the cattle
on the turnpike, and to presume that the head of the drove might
be at the crossing, or so near thereto, as to make it prudent to
moderate the rate of his speed in such degree as to give him entire
control of the engine. This he was bound to do, and what he was
bound to do the plaintiff had a right to presume would be done.
And the measure of precaution taken or omitted by the plaintiff,
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ca not be properly estimated without allowing him the full benefnt
of this presumption. If the rate of speed was under all circum-
stances, imprudent and unreasonable, the plaintiff was not only
not bound to anticipate it, but he had no right to presume that
the company would violate their rule of duty. Nor was it the
plaintiff's duty to send a signal along the road. He had no right
to be on the track himself except for the single purpose of passing
along the turnpike. The company are bound to employ all
necessary agents, to instruct them properly in their duties, and
to look to them for the performance of every act which the busi-
ness of the road requires. If the occasion required signals, it was
the business of the company's agent who was at hand to give them."
The cases of The Railroad v. Hummel, 3 Casey 101, and The
Turnpike Co. v. The Railroad, 4 P. F. Simith 845, furnish the
principles determining the respongibility of railroads for firing
perishable property along their lines of route. The first declares
the general projiosition of law, that railroad companies are liable
at common law for the damage done by fire occasioned by the
negligent management of their engines. The second avers that
the 'degree of care has no legal standard, but is measured in
every case by its circumstances. That which is ordinary care in
case of extraordinary danger, would be -extraordinary care in a
case of ordinary danger; and that which would be ordinary care
in a case of ordinary danger, would be less than.ordinary care in
a case of great danger, which, to adopt Mr. Ju~tice THompgm.'s*
observation in The Railroad v. McTighe, 10 Wright 821, is an
acute and active attention to the means of safety.. Applying-
these principles to the case in point, Which was a suit for a bridge
set on fire by sparks .from the railroad company's, engine, the
allegatioii being that there was not a proper spark-arrester-, the
court say: "If the construction Was that which was best adapted
for those purposes in known practical use at the time the alleged
cause of action arose, the duty of the company was performed,
nor should I look to entire uniformity in practice in a matter so
difficult of accomplishment as this. I kndw no better proof .of so
difficult a problem thin its practical accomplishment as far as ,it
has been. When something certainly better is invented, and
approved by the only true test of mechanical contrivances-prac.
tical experiment continued long enough to test its real utility-
then railroad companies will be bound to use it."
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There is not much light on the question on whom does the
burden rest to prove the plaintiff's alleged negligence, when the
defence is contributory negligence ? In Beatty v. Gilmore, 4
Harris 463, the court below charged that the onus probandi lay
upon the party averring the plaintiff's negligence. In error, the
Supreme Court did not disaffirm the charge.
In Railroad v. MeTighe, 10 Wright 320, THOMPSoN, J., says,
"I have no doubt there may be cases in which the plaintiff's case
would be incomplete without proof of care; such, for instance,
as where a prescribed mode of doing an act was required out of
which the injury sprang, or where a party should leap from a
train of cars to avoid a collision on well-grounded apprehension
thereof. But if a party omit this, where it is not necessary to
aver it in the narr., and the other side do not demur,.but go to
the jury on the want of such*element, or assume the burden of
proof, he could not nonsuit the plaintiff or ask a court to do more
than to submit the question to .the jury, ivhether, from all the
evidence, the plaintiff had been guilty of negligence or not.
In Railroad v. Hagan, 11 Wright 246, the court below was
asked by the plaintiff to charge, inter .alia, that " unless the jury
are satisfied by affirmative evidence that the deceased did not use
ordinary care, the plaintiff is entitled to recover." The court so
charged, and the Supreme Court did not disaffirm it.
In Myers 'v. Snyder, Bright. Rep. 489, the question of con-
tributory carelessness was raised. But the plaintiff. was not
required to show that he was not negligent. This is plain from
the case, it being a suit by a newspaper carrier, who fell into a
cellar-way about three o'clock in the morning of October 25th,
and was there found by others.
With respect to the defendant's negligence, the burden of proof
is of course on the plaintiff: McGully v. Clarke, 4 Wright 399,
except where he is a passenger suing his carriers: Sullivan v.
Railroad, 6 Casey 234.
A study of the foregoing cases will compel admiration for the
excellent judgment and sound reasoning of the court which has
virtually laid down a code respecting the rights and obligations
of these corporations. The opinions consist so well, and are in
many instances so luminous with principles, that they furnish the
means of solving nearly all cases which can arise between pedes
trians and drivers of vehicles in large towns or cities. Each of
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these classes of persons has concurrent rights in the roadway of a
street. But the rights of the former away from crossings are
regulated by the fact that the vehicle is limited to the roadway,
and has less facility of control, while the rights of the former at
crossings are measured by the fact that these are the customary
places of public passage. Hence a driver, either of a passenger
railway car or of any other vehicle, is bound to approach an
intersection at such a rate of speed as to have complete control
of his vehicle. All drivers are bound to be watchful for the
presence of persons in the roadway, and to exert a more active
attention at crossings. If a little child is in the street, the bur-
den of care falls on the driver. If an adult is there, and the
driver is going at the rate of speed customary in cities and towns,
he has a right to presume that the adult is exercising his requisite
measure of care, and the adult has a right to presume that the
driver will continue to. approach at the lawful rate of progress.
If a parent suffeis an infant to go about unattended, this is negli-
gence on his part, and bars his -action; while if his child should
occasion injury to a vehicle lawfully progressing on its legalized
busihess, the parent would .be responsible. And as to fire com-
panies, it would seem they have only the same rights as others.
They may proceed along' the street at a" rate customary to the
roadway, and on .approaching a crossing must moderate enough
to have complete tbntrol of their apparatus., On arriving at the
vicinage of the fire, their duty to extinguish and arrest the spriead
of the flames entitles them to obstruct the street to a degree
necessary to the discharge of their duty. And if any. appliances
by which the obstruction could be mitigated should be devised,
and used long enough to test their utility, it would be their duty
to use them. It maybe added that if a pedestrian observes fire
apparatus, a vehicle, approaching 'at unlawful speed, he is bound
to use care proportioned to the danger. He may not rush into
peril, and claim that the unlawful movement of the vehicle
creates a responsibility to: him. Its responsibility in such a case
would be to the criminal law in certain coitingencies, and always
to the muncipality for breach of its police regulations.
L B. D.
